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CHAPTE R I.
7'ho are Joint Tort-Feasors.
It is a familiar doctrine that joint -,wrohg-doers : be
sued jointly, or severally and that one may be compelled to
pay all the damages caused by their ioint act. 7his is quai,-4*
ly put by Littleton thus, "Then divers doe a trespass the
same is joynt or severull at the wi'll of hi. to whom the
wrong is done". (Coke upon Littleton, Butler & Hargreave's
Notes, fec. 37:'). At the time Littleton wrote, this rule 7,.as
of comparatively easy application, since the interests of the
business world were not so complex as now. ','he vast increase
of corporations doing business in distant places, our easy
means of communication enabling persons a thousand miles a-
part to be in constant coinmuication, and the tre:. endous
transportation of assengers and merchandise all tend to make
the application of the riule difficult, in that it is often
not easy to determine who are, and who are not joint wrong-
doers.
The editor (73 '. ec. 137) lays down this rule for de-
termininj the question, "All persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, cooperate in, aid or abet the cora
mission of a trespas.s by another or who apirove of it after
it is done, if done for their benefit, are co-trespassers '~i t
the person committing the trespass, and are each liable as
principals to the sa:ie extent, and in the same manner as if
they had perfom-ied the 7,rongful act themselves." ,T:is rule,
'7rhile it covers all those cases in which the wrong-doer is 12
personally enaired in the trespass, does not help us in the
border-line cases where the parties omit some duty whereby
they become liable, or where each separately ;uts in motion
someforce which subsequently combines "Tith another and the
combined forces are the proximate cause of an injury. ,ut it
is in these ver- cases that the real difficulty arises, in
the words of the editor in (A.S;.R. 250) "The onlY portion of
the law upon the subject, about which there seems to be any
difficulty or doubt relates 'to the cases in w,%Iich a person
has been injured by distinct nehliyent acts, or omissions, of
whlIich two or more persons were guilty, but who were not part-
ners not co-owners nor enga-ed in any common design or enter-
prise".
These border-line cases 'ay be roiuishly divided into, pcr-
haps two classes, first, where the i,-rties fail in some duty,
and thus become liable, and second, where the acts of the par-
ties are separate and distinct won conmitted, but the sub-
t a1
sequently combine and beco>,:C 1 ro-imate cause of the injury.
mons
Of the first class the casc of zir '. .verson (121 '1.
Y. 319) is a veryj good illrstration. . defendants in this
case oyined three lots in severality, a d on these three lots
three brick stores; the front of these stores consisted of
one thick brick wall into which the Dartitions separatin, the
stores were built. hese stores Y'rere burned, and this front
wall, about sixty feet hiyh ,.as left standing together with
parts of the partition '"ais. Shortly after the fire this
front wall bewan to bulge, and it continued so to do until
it fell, and killed the plaintiff's intestate, w o ,%ras pass-
inF along the street. The co urt held that the defendants ,,Tere
jointly liable.
In Klaider v. MicGrath(35 Pa. St. 128) arisinpj on a simi-
lar state of facts the court held the several defendants li-
able in the following lan:;uage. "'"!ere the keeping of the
wall safe was a comnmon duty, Lnd a failure to do so -,as a co,_,
mon neglect, the rule often recognized in that when an injury
has resulted from the concurrent negligence of several persors
they arejointly responsible." See also PecikhaEr v. 'Urlington
(Brayt. Vt. 13, )
The second class is illustrated by sever~l ',cli reasoned
cases which iuay be divided into (a) those where the separate
and independent acts have united in putting some new force or
aprent into motion which has caused theinjuryr. (b) 'rinere the
separate and independent acts have created a condition which
acted upon by a force of nature, has done harm. (c) W7here the
separate and concyrrent acts of negligence of the parties to-
gether caused injury.
(a) Stone v. Dickinson (5 Allen, 29) well illustrates
this division. Here nine different creditors separately got
the
out writs, and gave them to saum officer and he, acting upon
them arrested the plaintiff. The arrest was illegal, and up-
on the plaintiff suing the defendants the question came up
whether they were j",intly liable. The parties did not act in
concert but the arrest and imprisonment was the result of the
several writs which were sued simultaneously by the officer
employed by each individual. The court held the defendants
jointly lihble, saying: "Pre-concert or knowledge is not es-
sential to the commissionof a joint trespass. It is the fact
that they all united in the wrongfyl act, or set on foot the
agency by which it was committed, that renders them jointly
liable to the person injured. (See also Cole -rove v. lew Ha-
ven & T.Y& Harlem Ry. Cos. (20 NT. Y. 49.) for a dictum to t1-
same effect.
(b)As an example I will cite ,later v. Mlercereau (4 ,i1. Y.
138), the facts of which were substantiall these. The de-
fendant 'gras one of several contractors at work on a building
adjoining the plaintiff's premises. One nf the duties of the
defendant was to put up a water-spout to carry the ",rater from
the roof to the sewer. This he did so negligently as not to
acoomplish its ptrpoese. Another firm of contractorsMoore
Bryant, building the vault and sidewalk in front of the
building, did this also very negligently. The result was that
upon there coming a heavy rainstorm large quantities of sur-
face water from the street and the roof of the building flow-
ed over on to plaintiff's premises, soake* into the basement,
he
where, hIad goods stored, and injured them.
It was found by the referee that the damages were causal
by the negligent way in which the water-spout, and the vault
and sidewalk, had been constructed. The questinn before the
court was whetlier the Cefendant would be held for all the dam-
ages, and it was held in the affirmative. The court said?"It
is true the defendant and Moore and Bryant were not gointly
interested in reference to the separate acts which produced
the daimages. Although the'y acted independently of each other,
they did act at the same time in causing the damages, each
contributing toward it, and although the acts were each alone
and of itself might not have caused the entire injury, under
the circumstances presentod there is no good reason -,;wy each
should not be liable for the damages caused by the different
acts of all. The water from both sources co mngled together,
and ;ecame one body concentrating at the same locality,soak-
ing through the mall into plaintiff's premises and injuring
plaintiff's property; and it cannot be said t -at the water
which the defendant's negligence caused to flo.r upon the plain-
tiff's premises, and which became a portion of all whichcame
there did not produce the damage complained of. ".'e water
through which each of the arties were instrumental in injur-
ing the plaintiff ,,as one mass and inseparable, and no dis-
tinction can be made between the different sources from whenoe
it flowed, so that it cnuld he claimed that each caused a sepl
arate and distinct injury for which each one is separately re-
sponsible. "
In Kansas City v. Slangstrom (36 Pac. R. 706) decided in
1894, the cause of action arose from t,,n parties obstructing
a stream, so that it over-flowed plaintiff's premises, and al-
though they acted separately and independently, the court said
"The acts of either one would have occasioned injury, and as
both contributed in obstructing the stream a j6 int liability
arises against them."
The test in all these cases for c! etermining whether theye
is a joint liability or not see-s to be the one adopted by the
court in Consolidated ,iachine Co. v. Keifer (134 Ill. 481),
"Whether or not the negligence of each directly contributed
in producing the injurious result."
The cases which lay Jown the doctrine, that whcrc the
separate and concurrent acts of the two or more parties cause
a single injury to a third person tlnose caus, injur
may be held jointly or severally, have arisen outof collisiors
caused by the negligence of the servants of commoMl curriers.
Such was the case of Colegrole v. New Haven and Harlem Ry.
Cos. (20 N. Y. 492) It -ras ield in that case thaat the two cor
panies were jointly Liable, the court saying, "Had the collis
ion set in motion a third body -.7hick. in its movement had come
in contact ',ith, ..nd 1 ro ucod thi : aie evil to the -lai.tiffi-,
no i0 old r.vson can ba as,ii d _st heir j iin' ;i-bili ;
s case s in " -ri l l no ner c;io 1 4'_ at on."
case
The case of Cuddy v. HOrn (46 Mich.596) was anothero.
colkision, plaintiff's intestate having been killed in the
collision between two steamboats, the collision being caused
by the negligence of those in charge of the steamboats. The
court held that the proprietors of the two steamboats were
jointly liable, and said in the course of the opinion,"An act
wrongfully done by the joint a. ency or co-operation of sever-
al persons will render them liable jointly or severally. The
injury done in the case resulted from the collision caused
by the contemporaneous act, of the two separate vwrong-doers,
who not acting in concert yet by their simultaneous acts put
in motion the ai-encies, :hich tol:,ther caused the single in-
jury, and fori this the injured party could receive brt
a single compensation." Seein addition Grand Trynk Ry. Co. v.
Cummings (106 U. S. 700).
T'Ie result of the cases summed up would seem to be this.
That asidc from the cases where all are actively engaged
in the joint commission of an injury, TTiich casesare clear
and cause no trouble, there are two classes of joint-tort-
feasors:
First, where two or more persons are under a joint duty
to perform some act, a failure to perform the same causing in-
jury, will make those under the obligation, liable as joint
tort-feasors.
Second, two or more parties are liable as joint tort-
feasors, even though their acts when committed were entirely
separate and distinct, if thoseacts united in puttin.,--ome
new force or agent into motion, or creatcda conrition which
acted upon by a force of nature has done harm, or the acts
while sCparate and distinct were concurrent acts o f negli-
Fence which together caused the injury, providirn however, t:t
that the acts so combined hre the proximate cause of the inju-
ry complained of. Where, however, the several acts committed
each give rise to a separate cause of action when done, 1ut
the results of these severzl torts unite, and as a consequence
do further injury, then the partires in fault cannot be held
as joint wrong-doers, but each one is liable only for the
daina -es which can be traced to the tort committed by him.
This is well brought out by the two cases of Chipman v.
Palmer (77 11. Y. 51) and Little Schuylkill Navigation, Rail-
road and Coal Co. v. Rishard's Administrator (57 Pa. St. 142)
In Chipman v. Palmer the facts were tilese, the plaintiff was
keeping a boarding house on the banks of a stream, there were
s it'71-ted,
also anumber of other hotels and boarding ho, ses t sdigh-
er up nn the stream.
These had been accistomed to empty refuse and sewurage
into the stream, and as a result it became contaminated to
such an extent as to bec ome a nuisance,. As a consequence a
portion of plaintiff's boarders left. Plaintiff sued defend-
ant, one of these who emptied s -Iwerage into the stream for tio
7,hole damages caused by the loss of her boarders, urging that
all who contributed to the fouling of the water were liable
as joint tort-feasors. The court held that they were not
joint tort-feasors saying the injury ",*.as occasioned by the
discharge of sewerag-e frowi the Dremises of the defendant and
other owners of lots into the creek, separately and independ-
I
ently of each other. Aihe ri ht of action arises from the dis-
char:e into the stre -,m and the nu.tance is nly a consequence
of the acts. T3.e liabilitr commences with the act of the de-
fendant upon his own premises, and this act is separate, and
independent of, and without any rejard to the acts of others,
the defendant's act being several when it was comnitted, can-
not be made joint because of the consequences which followed
in connection with others ,,ho had done the same or a similar
act."
In Little Schuylkill Co. v. Richards the faet.s were as follow
A number of mine bwners had deposited coal dirt, and refuse
from their respective mines, on the banks, and in the stream
upon which Richards had his mill. This dirt, and refuse wash-
ed down filled the dam and destroyed the w.tur power by which
the mill was run. The judge in the court below charged the
jury that,"If at the time the defendants were engaged in thro
ing the coal-dirt itto the river about ten miles above the
dam, the sa e thin7 -as being Cone at the other c6llieries ar.
the defendants knew of this, they were liable for the combin-
ed result of all the series of deposits from the mines above
from 1851 to 1858", the period during wiich the dam mas filled
Upon appeal this charge was held erroneous, "The fallacy lies
said the court, "in the assumption that the deposit of the
dirt by the stream in the baijn is the foundation of the lia-
bility. It is the immediate causc of the injury, but t.e
[.round of action is the negligent act above. The right of ao-
tion rises upon the acto~throwing the dirt into the stream,
this is the tort while the deposit below is only a conse-
quenc(;. Therefore the liability began above with the defend-
ant's act upon his own land, and this act was wholly separate
and independent of all concert with others- This tort was sev
eral when it was conmitted and it is difficult to see how it
afterward became joint because its consequences united with
other consequences. The union of consequences did not in-
crease his injury. If the dirt were deposited mountain high
by the stream his dirt filled only its own space, and it was
Oadeneither morenor less by the 4ccretions."
In Blaisdell v. Stephen (14 :rv. 15) it appeared that te'
defendants had pnermitted waste water to flow from their re-
spective premises into a natural slough or channel througrh
which it finally reachc, ,.laintiff's drain ditch, and injured
it upon a certain occasion. It was held that they were not
joint tort-feasors because as the court said, "In this case
the right of action arises, if at all, upon the act of allo--
ing the waste water to run into the slough from the land of
the defendants. Tis is the tort. Thedamage to th(; drain
ditch below is only a consequence." ,-or further cases on thc
subject set U.Tiller v. HighlnCd Ditch Co. (87 Cal. 430), 7ard
v. Casey (2, Pa. St. 482), Citr of Detroit v. Chaffee (37 U.
Wf Rep. 882), Sellick v. Hall (47 Conn. 260)
7Thile at law in cases like Blaisdell and Stephens, and
the other cases cited above, the defendants causing the con-
sequential injury, cannot be sued as joint tort-feasors, yet
there is abundant authortty that they ma: all be joined as de-
fendants in a suit in equity for the purpose of obtaining,; at
injunction against them.
The'Mining Debris Case (8 Sawyer , U. S. Cir. ,628);
Hillman v. ewington (57 Cal. 56)
People v. Gold Run etc. Co. (66 Cal. 138);
Blaisdell v. Stpphen (14 'Nev. 17);
Goodyear v. Schaefer (5.7 Md. 1);
Thorp v. Brumfitt (8 L. R. Ch. App. 656);
Lamberton v. Mellish (L. P. 1894 3 Ch. 153).
CHAPTER II,
a'hat aounts to a Satisfaction for a Joint Yong.
This question becomes very ivportant wuere the injured
party wishes to proceed against several of the joint wron'r-
doers, or having sued one and finding him w-)rthless wishes-to
0
get compensation from another.
T'he courts are all a,)reed that suit can be brought a! airt
all or any number of the trespassers, and prosecuted until tie
injured ;,arty has obtained satisfaction. But riiKht at this
point there is a wide divergence of opinion as to wat consti-
tutes satisfa tion. The general doctrine in this country is
at IT riance with the law as developed in Bngland. T-e early
cases in that country do not seem to be alto-,et_'her clear on
the point, but the case of Brown v. 'octten (Cro. Jac. 73)
started a line of decisions i-'iich estab1ished squarely the
proposition that a jud inent in an action a ainst one of s eve-
al joint tort-feasors is a bar to an action aiainst others far
the same cause, although stch judgment remains wholly unsatis-
fied.
The grounds upon w'hich these decisions have been placed
are two in number, first on the ,rolind of public policy to
prevent multiplicity of suits, a :d second the' legal. maxim,
transit in rem judicatures, the cause of action is changed into
inatter of record, which is of a higher nature Ahd the infer-
tor remedy is merged in the higher"".
King v.Hoare,(13 Mees/ & Welsb, 493)
Brinsmead v. Harria n (L. R. 7 C. P. 547).
The English doctrine has never obtain much recognition
in this country. In Livingston v. Bishop (1 Johns. 290) decid
ed in 1806, Chancellor Kent after a thorough examination of
the authorities held that Brown v. Wootton was not in accord-
ance with the earlier English authorities and refused to fol-
low it. He waid,"If there can be but one recovery it is vain
to say that the plaintiff mry bring separate suits, for the
cause that happens to be first tried may be used by way of
plea puis darrien continuance t- defeat the other actions
that are in arrears. The more rational rule appears to be
that where you elect to bring separate actions for a joint
trespass you may have separate recoveries and but one satis-
faction, and that the plaintiff may elect de melioribus dam-
nis, and issue his execution accordingly; and that where he
has made his election he is concluded by it, and that if he
should afterwards proceed against the other defendants they
should be relieved on payment of their costs."
In Sheldon v. Kibbe (ZConn. 214) Hosmer Ch. J., after
discussinga and quoting from the opinion of Chancellor K.ent
in Livingston v. Bishop (supra) said, "The common law founded
as it isupon reason, and allowing nothing that is nugatory
much less that is pernicious, will sanction no ixutilit7Y or
absurdity. Now what can be more absurd than to authorize the
pendency and proceeding of twenty separate actions at-ainst
persons concermed in a joint trespass, and after t;-e accumula-
tion of vast expense to hold thatthe first judgment bars the
other suits."
It remained after the decision of these two cases for tih
United States Supreme Court to complete the overthro:.r of the
English doctrine in th is country, ,hich it did fb_ the case of
Lovejoy v. Murray (3 '.all. i), after a thorough examination c
the authorities both Englith and American, and in the follow-
ing language: "If we turn from the examination of adjudged
cases, wThich larg-ely preponderate in favor of t)ic doc-
trine that a jud,-ment without satisfaction is no bar to look,
at t:qe question in the light of reason, that doctrine commends
itself to us still more strongly. The whole theory of the op-
posite view is based upon technical, artificial and unsatis-
factory reasoning." .......- - - "J7e are therefore of it
the opinion that nothing short of satisfaction can make good
a plea of former judgment in trespass, offered as a bar in an
action a ainst another joint trespasser -,-.ho is not -)art,, to
the first judgment."
The general American doctrine now is that different suits
may be brought and rtrosecuted until the plaintiff obtains a
real satisfaction. Osterhout v. Roberts(8 Conn. 43)
Lovejoy v. Lurray (3 77all, 1)
Sheldony. Kibble (3 Conn. 214);
Livingstonlv. Bishop (1 J. 1'. 290).
But it is held in some few states that final judgment ard
execution or an order for an execution against one of several
joint trespassers is a discharge of all the others.
Allen v. WTheatley (3 13lackf. 332);
Fleming v. McDonald (50 Ind. 278);
White v. Philbrick, (5 Me. 147)
Page v. Freeman (19 Mo. 421);
Boardman v. Aler (13 1.1ich. 77).
1T'hen, however, the injured party ,ives a release to one
of several Ooint tort-feasors the universal doctrine is that
all are discharged, this doctrine goes as far back as Little-
ton who says,"1V.en divers doe a trespasse the same is jognt cr
severall at the will of him to .-whom the wrong is done, yet if
he release to one of them all are discharged." (Coke upon Lit-
tleton, (Gutler and .Talreavesl notes) 375)
Coche v. Jeniaor (Ho!). 3:5)
Ayer v. Ashmead (31 Conn. 447";
Lrown v. Uarsh (7 Vt. 327)
K -ickerbocker v. Culvcr (8 Conn. 111);
Luble v. Freeman (2 HL r). & ijf. 38);
Spurr v. . tid. Pq. Co. (28 At. Rep. 528).
It seems that the proper method to pursue if a person
wishes to settle '/ith one tort-feasor :,ithout losing his rif±
a%,ainst the other is to covenant not to sue, since the courts
have held th-_at this does not operate as a release.
'7iller v. Fenton (11 Pai--e, 18)
Duck v. :I&,eu (L. R. , ,. B. Div. 1892, Vol. 2)
C H A P T B R III.
------------0 ---
Can there be Indemnity between Joint Tort-Feasors?
It is a familiar maxim of the law that there can be no
contribution ot redress between joint tort-feasors. Declared
for the first time in the case of Merryweather v- Nixon (8 T.
R. 186) decided in 1799, it has been repeated over and over -
ag,-ain by the courts, and applied often blindly to facts which
should never have come under the rule. Tihe rule itself it
se-ms to me is but an application of a tLeneral doctrine that
where two parties arein pari delicto the court will not inter-
fere to help either party but will leave them just where it
finds them. This is well illustrated by the case of Atkins v.
Johnson (43 Vt. 78). The plaintiff in this action was pub-
lisher of a newspaper and brought the action upon an agree-
ment in writing made by defendant, that if plaintiff would p
publish in his newspaper an article entitled "A Jack at all
save
trades exposed" the defendant would -7 "h Iim harmless from the
consequence thereof. The article proved to be a libel, and
t-he judgment was recovered against plaintiff for thepublica-
tinn thereof, which judgment he was obliged to pay. It was
held by the court that the parties were joint wrong doers, ayd
that the agreement could not be enforced. Pierpont , C. F.,
